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The Issue of National Security in the Context
of National Space Legislation—Comparing
European and Non-European States
F. G. von der Dunk
1. Introduction
The inherent dual-use character of most, if not all space activities cannot fail to exercise a
considerable impact also on the involvement of private actors in space. Much technology
used for and/or developed by private space activities may potentially be put at the use of
those wishing to change a particular political status quo, and likewise the material results
of some private space activities may, consciously or inadvertently, come to be used against
the national security interests of one state or another. Hence, issues of national security
will likely also have an effect on the issue of authorisation of such actors on the national
level. In some cases, that has led to quite general comprehensive regimes being developed
for all international trade and trade-related activities concerning sensitive dual-use items,
alternatively very specific regimes dealing with the security-related aspects of high-resolution remote-sensing operations involving private actors.1
In addition, however, the increasing implementation of a general approach to the licensing of private space operators with a view to (amongst others) safety and liability-related
aspects also raises the issue as to what extent implementation measures address, more or
less specifically, the national security– and defence-related aspects of the licensed operations concerned.
Thus, the present contribution will provide a survey of existing national space legislation—defined for the purpose as national statutes addressing in a general and comprehensive fashion private space activities falling within the jurisdiction of the state concerned—
as to how reference has been made to such concerns. “Europe” being defined for the moment as the member states of the European Union and/or the European Space Agency
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(ESA),2 this would mean addressing on the one hand the European states Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands and France, and—in order to provide
some larger comparative perspective—on the other hand the United States, the Russian
Federation, South Africa, the Ukraine, Australia, Brazil, South Korea and Canada.3
2. National Space Law in Europe and the National Security Issue
2.1. Norway
Norway, not an EU member yet member state of ESA very much from the beginning, was
the first state drafting a national law to deal with the prospect of private parties undertaking space activities, notably launch activities, by means of the Act on launching objects
from Norwegian territory into outer space.4 Indeed the Norwegian Act provided for a requirement to obtain permission from the Norwegian government for anyone launching an
object into outer space from Norwegian territory, ships or aircraft, or “[a]reas that are not
subject to the sovereignty of any state, when the launching is undertaken by a Norwegian
citizen or person with habitual residence in Norway.”5 Launching, of course, is the category of space activities most directly associated with security issues in view of the nearimpossibility to distinguish between launch vehicles and missiles.
Predating the entry into force of the Liability Convention6 by some three years and with
only the Outer Space Treaty7 and Rescue Agreement8 in force, the Norwegian draftsmen
were unable to provide much detail on the requirements to be fulfilled in order to acquire
a license, including apparently requirements regarding security: “[c]ertain terms can be set
for such permission as described” in the paragraph cited above, and the authorities “can
issue regulations on control etc. of activities as described” in that same paragraph.9 Whilst
such “terms” could obviously include security- and defence-related interests of the Norwegian government, to be inserted in the implementing regulations referred to, the Act
itself did not provide any further clue as to the extent that would, or should, actually happen in any given case.
2.2. Sweden
Norwegian’s Scandinavian neighbour Sweden followed suit with national space legislation in 1982.10 All activities in outer space conducted from Sweden or by Swedish natural
or legal persons require a license under the Swedish Act.11 In terms of conditions attached
to such a license, the Act is not much more specific than the Norwegian Act was: “A licence
may be restricted in the way deemed appropriate with regard to the circumstances. It may
also be subject to required conditions with regard to control of the activity or for other
reasons.”12 Disregarding the fundamental requirement to obtain a license in undertaking
space activities covered by the Act carries with it a fine or a maximum penalty of imprisonment of one year.13 The Act, however, does not use the terms “security” or “defence,” or
indeed any other term relevant from the current perspective.
The ensuing Decree, providing the National Board for Space Activities (NBSA) with the
licensing authority under the Act on behalf of the Swedish government, offers a little more
detail. It calls upon the NBSA to consult with other national ministries or authorities “affected by the application” as necessary for the proper handling of the license request, and
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while only the telecommunications administration is mentioned explicitly here, of course
it would make sense to consult with the Swedish Ministry of Defence in case a license
application raises issues of national security.14 Again, however, no specific reference to
such issues is found.
One should be aware in this context that Sweden for a long time was taking a relatively
neutral stance in the political Cold-War division of Europe between the NATO allies and
the Soviet Union’s satellite states, including a vocal, sometimes almost anti-military stance
in international politics. Partly for such reasons, for example accession to the European
Union was only politically feasible after the end of the Cold War—and ultimately took
place in 1995. Such a background may well be largely responsible for the omission of any
specific reference to defence or security in the Swedish case, lest suspicions would arise
that Swedish space activities might somehow have a military or security-related aspect,
connotation, or even purpose.
In addition, the most immediately relevant space activities to be undertaken from Sweden would be launches from the Esrange facilities in Kiruna. These, however, were generally undertaken in cooperation with (or even simply by) the European Space Agency,
which under its Convention was formally required to undertake its space activities “exclusively for peaceful purposes.”15 This background may well have conspired to cause any
explicit reference to security concerns in terms of space activities to remain absent from the
Act and Decree.
2.3. The United Kingdom
The United Kingdom promulgated its Outer Space Act in 1986.16 This Act is the first one in
Europe making explicit reference to defence- and security-related aspects in the context of
the license for space activities, which is mandatory for citizens of the United Kingdom.17
Notably, the Secretary of State, the UK Member of Cabinet responsible for licenses (and
having delegated that responsibility to the UK Space Agency, UKSA) “shall not grant a
licence unless he is satisfied that the activities authorised by the licence (. . .) will not impair
the national security of the United Kingdom.”18
Sections 4 and 5 provide further detailed authority to investigate and monitor a potential licensee to determine whether the licensing requirements would actually be complied
with. This comprises amongst others the possibility to include in a license “in particular (.
. .) conditions (. . .) requiring the licensee to conduct his operations in such a way as to (. .
.) preserve the national security of the United Kingdom.”19 Licenses granted may also be
revoked, varied, or suspended, as necessary, to protect these interests.20 Section 8 in addition provides the authorities with quite far-reaching competences with regard to licensees
acting in violation of the license requirements, which include the option to “give such directions as appear to him necessary to secure the cessation of the activity or the disposal of
any space object.”21 Section 12 finally details the procedures according to which violators
would be sanctioned.
In short: the Outer Space Act, though in itself still relatively succinct, provides the UK
authorities with sufficient and sufficiently explicit and comprehensive legal instruments
to ensure that also the particular security-related interests of the United Kingdom will be
duly protected in the course of any private space activities licensed under the Act.
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2.4. Belgium
After the United Kingdom had enunciated its Act in 1986, it took almost twenty years for
the next European country to follow suit: Belgium enacted its national space law as late as
2005.22 It provided for an obligation to obtain an authorisation for anyone undertaking
space activities from within Belgian territorial (including quasi-territorial) jurisdiction, as
well as in certain cases for Belgian citizens conducting such activities elsewhere.23 Those
activities included all activities coming to mind as being potentially security-sensitive:
launching, satellite navigations, and satellite remote sensing.24
In order to be granted such an authorisation, amongst others conditions ensuring due
protection of the “strategic (. . .) interests of the Belgian State” could be imposed by the
Belgian authorities, but the discretion to do so lies with the authorities—at least under the
Law itself.25
Articles 7 through 12 provide for an elaborate set of rules and procedures to provide the
licensing authority with the legal instruments to enforce the requirements of the Law and
any license granted under it, which include for example the competence, if necessary, to
“take action to deorbit or destroy the space object.”26 Though there is no direct reference to
security or defence interests, it may be safely assumed that once the decision would indeed
be made in a given case to include conditions protecting the aforementioned “strategic
interests” of Belgium—these instruments could and would be used as required in this context.
2.5. The Netherlands
The next European country of concern is the Netherlands, which has a national space law
in place since 2007.27 As with the other national space laws discussed, pride of place belongs to a licensing requirement in regard of private space activities, imposed in this case
upon those performing space activities in or from within the Netherlands, Dutch ships, or
aircraft; an obligation which can be extended moreover to certain space activities performed by Dutch nationals elsewhere or organised from within the Netherlands, even if
actually undertaken outside.28 Again, such private space activities include all activities relevant from a security perspective.29
Amongst the restrictions that can be imposed on licensees by means of additional requirements, those targeted at “protection of the public order” and, even more to the point,
protecting the “security of the State” are explicitly mentioned.30 Reference to security issues
is further made in the context of potential disasters:
If an incident occurs or has occurred that may jeopardize (. . .) national security
(. . .) the licence-holder shall, without delay, take the steps that can reasonably be
expected of it in order to prevent the consequences of that event or, where those
consequences cannot be prevented, to limit and rectify them as far as possible.31
As in the case of Belgium, the ultimate decision to include relevant requirements in a particular regulation or license is to be made by the Dutch authorities; they are not included
automatically as such. However, the responsible Minister has to refuse the grant of a license
if, in his view, “facts or circumstances suggest that (. . .) the maintenance of public order or
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national security might be jeopardized by issuing the licence,” which may considerably
mitigate the lack of a default requirement to comply with the national security interests of
the Netherlands.32
In line with the general approach to licenses prevailing under national space laws, also
the Dutch Law provides the authorities with various procedural instruments to ensure
proper application of its licensing obligations with a view to the Dutch national securityrelated interests, such as the competences to revoke a license after it has been granted, to
enforce compliance by means of further administrative orders, and to sanction violations
of the terms of the license and/or the Law.33
To explain background and reasons behind the establishment of the Law, as is required
under Dutch law an Explanatory Memorandum had accompanied its promulgation.34 It
confirmed the increasing involvement of private actors also in the Dutch context, both present and prospective, as presenting the most important reason behind the establishment of
the Law, together with the need to implement the main international space treaties in that
respect. In doing so, however, it barely touches upon security- or defence-related issues:
the main focus is indeed on implementing the requirements and consequences of Articles
VI, VII, and VIII of the Outer Space Treaty, the Liability Convention, and the Registration
Convention.35
No specific reference is made therefore by the Explanatory Memorandum to security or
defence-related issues, and/or to a role for example of the Dutch Ministry of Defence in
being privy to the licensing process executed by the Ministry of Economic Affairs. Not
even in the discussion on Section 3, as the Section of the Law where the security of the
Netherlands is explicitly included in potential further regulations or the licenses itself, is
any specific explanation or elaboration given in this respect.36 The discussion of Section 6,
providing for the grounds for refusal of a license, does only confirm that the likelihood
that the grant of a license might “jeopardize (. . .) national security” may present such a
ground, without going into any further details.37
The framework provisions of the Law have meanwhile been elaborated to some extent
by means of an Order Concerning Licence Applications for the Performance of Space Activities and the Registration of Space Objects.38 This Order details the procedure relevant
to applications for licenses, including the information to be provided by the prospective
licensee, but it focuses almost exclusively on safety-related and financial issues with a view
in particular to handle international liability and attendant insurance consequences of the
licensee’s future space activities.
Only the requirement to provide “as complete a description as possible of the space
activities in question” indirectly allows the authorities to judge to some extent whether
those space activities may actually be harmful to Dutch national security interests.39 Of
course, if such information does not completely satisfy the authorities, or would not allow
them a reasonably solid judgement, more information could be requested on an informal
level. Still, whilst normally speaking private actors interested in space activities in the
Dutch context might not be expected to involve themselves in such activities as directly
presenting a risk of interference with national security interests,40 these succinct provisions
might not turn out to be sufficient—for example in cases where foreign remote-sensing
operators might be looking for a license under the Dutch Law.
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2.6. France
In spite of its long-standing involvement in space activities also through the private sector
(Arianespace and SpotImage both being French companies) France was the last European
country so far to draft a comprehensive national space law, in 2008.41 There were a number
of reasons for this absence of a perceived need for a national law so far, one of them being
that both the aforementioned companies had the French governmental space agency CNES
as the largest single shareholder, allowing for direct control of all their activities by the
French government to the extent it could be held responsible and liable under the international space treaties.42 In addition, SpotImage was essentially marketing and selling
remote-sensing data from the SPOT system, which was itself directly operated by the
French government (with minor participation of some other European states).
With Arianespace, a private company offering launch services on a commercial basis to
a global market, the situation was a bit more complex, due to the fundamental involvement
of the European Space Agency (ESA) and other ESA member states beside France in the
Ariane launcher development programmes.43 Thus, the legal framework within which Arianespace was to operate consisted of a triptych of legal documents, essentially acting in
lieu of a national authorisation process that might otherwise have been required.
These documents were the Arianespace Declaration of 1980 (regularly renewed since),44
the Arianespace Convention concluded between ESA and Arianespace45 and the CSG
Agreement.46 Apart from regulating such issues as liability and insurance,47 a few provisions referred to the potential involvement of Arianespace in issues pertinent to international peace and security. Thus, for example the Arianespace Declaration required the
company to operate (only) for “peaceful purposes,”48 further to the obligation resting upon
ESA itself to undertake its activities “exclusively for peaceful purposes.”49 It should be surmised, given the specific context of the Ariane programme as involving a host of European
states, that such a requirement would likely also exclude any activity detrimental to the
national security interests of France and the other ESA member states involved in the programme and Arianespace’s follow-on activities of building, marketing, and selling the services of Ariane launch vehicles.
As to those national security issues more specifically, however, there was no clause
making explicit reference to them. Participating states could of course dissociate themselves from a particular launch, inter alia in case they felt their security interests would be
at stake.50 Yet, control of the company’s activities through the CNES shareholding and the
general obligations to operate within the framework set by ESA and the member states,
including notably France, were apparently already considered to solve any concerns on
such issues.
Once France decided to draft a national space law, as a more fundamental and comprehensive tool to control amongst others Arianespace’s activities, however, also these securityand defence-related issues were back on the table. They were to be dealt with, consequently, as part of the process of authorisation of private space operators under the Law,
which pertained to any operator of a space activity, including launching, conducted from
French territory as well as any French operator launching space objects from outside
France.51
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The French Law is very outspoken concerning national security concerns: “Authorizations cannot be granted when the operations for which they are requested, regarding in
particular the systems intended to be implemented, are likely to jeopardise national defence interests.”52 Further clauses allow the French authorities to elaborate such obligations
in more detail, to control the activities once authorised, and to impose sanctions.53
Transfer of a space object to the command of a third party, after the original activities
have been authorised, still requires a separate authorisation—inter alia in view of the security risks posed by uncontrolled transfers of space objects to parties that as such may not
be subject to French jurisdiction.54 Authorisations specifically can be revoked or suspended
when, once more, the activities at issue “are likely to jeopardise the national defence interests”—whether in contravention of a specific provision in the authorisation or not.55
Finally, specific provisions are included which take care of the potential for remotesensing operations to jeopardise French national security:
Any primary space-based data operator undertaking in France an activity having
certain technical characteristics defined in a decree passed at the Council of State
must preliminarily declare it to the competent administrative authority. These
technical characteristics are related in particular to the resolution, location accuracy, observation frequency band and quality of the Earth observation data
which are received or for which a satellite system is programmed.56
Only to the extent the planned operations would not “harm fundamental interests of the
Nation, particular defence matters, foreign policy and international commitments of
France” might the authorisation be granted.57
In any event, “the launching and guiding, for the needs of national defence, of vehicles
[of] which [the] trajectory passes through outer space” and the activities of the French Ministry of Defence itself acting as space operator are not subject to the relevant limitations
under the Act in this respect; it is considered self-evident that such activities have French
national security at heart as their overriding concern in any event.58
2.7. Concluding Remarks
Comparing the six member states of ESA and the European Union currently possessing a
national space law with a licensing system for handling private participation in space activities, it turns out they offer a wider range of ways of handling the security issues inevitably involved in most space activities, including the private ones, than might have been
expected.
The frameworks for authorisation of private space activities in Norway and Sweden
make no reference whatsoever to issues of national security or defence. Norway only refers
to “certain terms”59 which may be included in the authorisation, whereas Sweden along
the same lines only requires in a very general sense to take “the circumstances” into consideration and allows the imposition of conditions “for other reasons” than controlling the
activity.60 The United Kingdom is the first European state explicitly mentioning “the national security” of the state as a key consideration in granting a license, and therefore as a
justification for imposing relevant conditions upon the licensee, but whether and what
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specific conditions will actually be imposed remains at the discretion of the licensing authority.61
Whilst the national space laws of Belgium and the Netherlands, promulgated some
twenty years later, are considerably lengthier and more detailed, those details largely refer
to the procedures ensuring proper implementation and enforcement of licenses, and do
not lie in detailing the substantive reasons for imposing conditions in the first place or
detailing such conditions. In the Belgian case the reference is to “strategic interests,”62 in
the Dutch case to “security” respectively “national security”;63 but as with the United Kingdom, ultimately the decision to actually impose relevant conditions rests with the respective authorities (albeit that in the case of the Netherlands, the responsible Minister is forced
to take action in case he considers it likely that “the maintenance of public order or national
security might be jeopardized by issuing the licence”;64 whereas the UK case amounts to a
similar construction).
It may also be noted, furthermore, that none of these national acts make reference to
involvement in the licensing process of the national military or defence authorities. Sweden actually comes closest in its requirement resting upon the licensing authority, the
NBSA, to “consult (. . .) national ministries or authorities affected by the application” for a
license.65 Of course, neither of the respective licensing authorities themselves are part of
the military or security-side of government: they concern a wide variety of civil space
boards and Ministries such as of Economic Affairs or Science and Research, but never the
Ministry of Defence.
Perhaps, however, not too much value should be attached to the rather open-ended
character of those formulations. It still seems rather unlikely that in case a private operator’s planned activities would actually be perceived as presenting potential national security risks, the licensing authorities would not use the options available to them to impose
relevant conditions or requirements upon the licensee after all. It is more a matter of relative legal uncertainty at the outset, as to what would be regarded as relevant security interests, than a matter of absence of national legal controls for those purposes.
Clearly the major exception in all these respects is France. France does provide for a
straightforward obligation for the licensing authority to only authorise private space activities if they are not “likely to jeopardise national defence interests,” and further key controls are in place in the French Law to this effect, including a specific set of clauses
regarding remote sensing.66 France also represents the only case where an explicit reference
to a Ministry of Defence has occurred in the national space laws of member states of ESA
and the European Union.
Likely, it was a combination of specific factors in the French case giving rise to this very
upfront and thorough handling of possible national security concerns in the context of private space activities to be licensed. These would range from a general historical militaristic
tradition of grandeur (in explicit contrast with, for example, Sweden and the Netherlands),
to an outspoken desire to remain master of its own destiny by depending on its own military force (as illustrated by such issues as the French refusal to agree to a European Defence
Community in the 1950s, the development of its own nuclear force and its independent
behaviour within the Western alliance), to the administrative centralist make-up of the
state forcefully asserting its presence also in the space arena. Surely, the history of Ariane
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and Arianespace (following the French urge to develop an originally French, then independent European launch vehicle under French leadership) as well as that of SPOT and
SpotImage has moreover provided specifically France with a realisation from up close of
the potential of such activities to threaten national security interests.
Whatever the origins, however, France stands out as the Single ESA and EU member
state having so far addressed the national security concerns that might arise as a consequence of licensed private space activities in a thorough and upfront manner.67 Since,
moreover, the possibility to obtain a license under the French Law is open to any operator
undertaking launch activities from French territory, with enjoyment of the third-party liability reimbursement cap offered by the French authorities available to anyone operating
from within the European Union or another member state of the European Economic Area,
this may have interesting consequences for private space activities and their licensing beyond the strict scope of French jurisdiction.68
3. Non-European National Space Laws and the Security Issue
3.1. Introductory Remarks
In the previous chapter six cases of member states of ESA and/or the European Union have
been discussed from the vantage point of security and defence issues: to what extent would
potential licensees be, or be likely to be, confronted with conditions and requirements in
the course of the licensing process which try to preserve the relevant national security interests of the states concerned.
This still leaves the majority of states in the ESA and EU realm without national space
laws, some of which belong to the main space powers in this part of the world: Germany
(although, as seen, Germany has at least taken care of the security concerns in the specific
context of private involvement in remote sensing), Italy and Spain. In the absence of any
clear guidance on the international level as to the details of any such national space legislation, of any competence so far of ESA or even the Union to dictate such details or impose
a measure of harmonisation upon them,69 and finally and particularly, of much de facto
coherence of those six laws on the issue of national security: once the decision to establish
a national space law has been taken these states may well look for guidance on handling
those issues also to the handful of non-European space laws that are in force dealing with
licensing of private space activities.
Thus, the present paragraph will deal from this perspective with the relevant national
space acts of the United States, Russia, South Africa, the Ukraine, Australia, Brazil and
South Korea.
3.2. The United States
The United States actually has, so far, three different national regimes for licensing private
space operators in place for the three space sectors where private participation was developing or at least at the time expected to shortly start developing: launching, satellite communications, and satellite remote sensing. In each of the three cases certain national
security concerns have found their way into the legislation, and will hence be inserted into
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the licensing of individual operators. The following paragraph will deal with each of these
three in turn from that vantage point.
3.2.1. US Licensing of Launch Service Providers
The Commercial Space Launch Act of 198470 opened up an era in the United States when
private companies could obtain formalised permission to offer launch services on the arising global market, although it was not until a fundamental amendment four years later
took away key concerns regarding unlimited liability that companies actually started to
apply for launch licenses.71 The 1988 version of the Act provided the Office of Commercial
Space Transportation (OCST), part of the Department of Transport’s Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), with the competences as delegated by the Secretary of Transport to
grant licenses under the Act, for any operator wishing to undertake launches or re-entry
operations or operate a spaceport from/to/on US territory as well as any US operators wishing to undertake such activities elsewhere.72
The licensing obligations are spelled out in Section 70105 of the Act. Grant of a license
should be “[c]onsistent with (. . .) national security and foreign policy interests” of the
United States, and the licensing authority may amongst others prescribe “additional requirement[s] necessary to protect” those.73 On the other side, specific licensing requirements or even the requirement to obtain a license per se may be waived in case US national
security and foreign policy interests would not be jeopardised by such a waiver.74
Two full Sections further deal with the requirement for the licensing authority to consult
and liaise with other departments, agencies, and even international partners in applicable
cases. Most notably for the current issue, “[t]he Secretary of Transportation shall consult
with the Secretary of Defense on a matter under this chapter affecting national security.
The Secretary of Defense shall identify and notify the Secretary of Transportation of a national security interest relevant to an activity under this chapter.”75
The Commercial Space Launch Act as now codified also provides for an extensive set
of rules to allow for comprehensive monitoring and sanctioning, such as suspending or
revoking the license, in case the above requirements are not being met.76 Section 70110
provides for the procedure applicable to administrative hearings and judicial review,
whereas enforcement and penalties are regulated by Section 70115, providing inter alia for
a maximum civil penalty of US$100,000.77
In short: the United States provides for a rather comprehensive and thorough regime to
ensure that the granting of licenses and the operations of licensees in the area of launch
activities do not impinge upon national security concerns—whilst at the same time not
being overly regulatory in this respect. Even in the US case, consequently, many of the
details will be left to the licensing process and individual licenses, which makes sense in
view of the large diversity of possible activities to be licensed under the Act considering
the broad range of launch and related activities which the private sector in the United
States is involved in.
3.2.2. US Licensing of Satellite Communication Operators
The area of satellite communications on the one hand was the space sector earliest subject
to commercialisation and privatisation but on the other hand does not raise security issues
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in the context of licensing to the same extent as launching, very high-resolution satellite
remote sensing, or satellite-based precision navigation. The US licensing system for private
satellite operators carries with it some clauses relating to these issues nevertheless.
Interestingly, these clauses go back to the 30s, since that is when the Communications
Act was promulgated, which in 1970 was then formally confirmed to apply to satellite
communications as well, in terms of inter alia licensing private operators in the field.78 The
regime established by the Act required from any person that wished to “use or operate any
apparatus for the transmission of energy or communications or signals by radio,” basically
from within the United States, or a US-registered ship or aircraft, to obtain a license from
the US Federal Communications Commission (FCC).79
The competencies of the FCC to this end are spelled out in quite some detail already in
Section 303—where no specific reference to security issues is made, however. Section 307,
dealing amongst others with the terms of licensees, calls upon the FCC to grant a license
“if public (. . .) interest (. . .) will be served thereby,” which presumably includes public
interests of a national security nature.80 Also, the FCC is granted the power to refuse construction permits or station licenses, for example “during a national emergency proclaimed
by the President or declared by the Congress and during the continuance of any war in
which the United States is engaged and when such action is necessary for the national
defense or security or otherwise in furtherance of the war effort.”81 If the license to be
granted is aimed at communications between the United States and foreign countries, the
FCC is specifically empowered to impose any terms or conditions, which obviously focuses
inter alia on the risks to US national security, which such communications might entail.82
A final interesting clause concerns Section 606, entitled “War powers of the President,”
whereby the President is entitled in the context of an ongoing war, “if he finds it necessary
for the national defense and security” of the United States, “to direct that such communications as in his judgment may be essential to the national defense and security shall have
preference or priority with any carrier” licensed under the Act.83 Furthermore, it is “unlawful for any person during any war in which the United States is engaged to knowingly
or willfully, by physical force or intimidation by threats of physical force, obstruct or retard
or aid in obstructing or retarding interstate or foreign communication by radio or wire,”
and in case of a violation of this prohibition, the President may even “employ the armed
forces of the United States to prevent any such obstruction or retardation of communication”84
Likewise, the President may “if he deems it necessary in the interest of national security
or defense (. . .) suspend or amend” any rules or regulations otherwise applicable to communications activities within the United States—subject to a formal proclamation that
“there exists war or a threat of war, or a state of public peril or disaster or other national
emergency.”85 Penalties for violations under this Section are scaled: under the 1934 Act a
maximum of US$1,000 or one year imprisonment would apply to a person who violates or
substantially contributes to such a violation, a maximum of US$5,000 if it concerns a legal
entity so acting, and, in deviation of the foregoing, a maximum of US 20,000 or twenty
years imprisonment, in case it concerns “an offense with intent to injure the United States,
or with intent to secure an advantage to any foreign nation.”86
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The provisions of the Communications Act thus focus largely on the national security
risks involved in international communications being used for spying activities, respectively of communications in the context of national defence being interrupted or obstructed, and proceeds to provide for appropriate legal instruments to counter those
threats. Whilst the Communications Act has been repeatedly amended, most fundamentally by the 1996 Telecommunications Act,87 the above conclusions would still hold true.
3.2.3. US Licensing of Satellite Remote-Sensing Operators
For those interested in operating remote-sensing satellite systems and/or marketing and
selling the data generated by such systems, the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA), a subdivision of the US Department of Commerce, acts as the
licensing authority. While the original act, the 1984 Land Remote Sensing Commercialization Act,88 setting NOAA up with this authority, was repealed by the 1992 Land Remote
Sensing Policy Act,89 the essential characteristics of the licensing system remained intact.
Thus, any “person who is subject to the jurisdiction or control of the United States may,
directly or through any subsidiary or affiliate, operate any private remote sensing space
system” only if granted a license by NOAA.90 The phrase “jurisdiction or control” is generally taken to comprise any relevant activities undertaken from US territory and/or by US
nationals, as well as activities with substantial connections to the United States allowing
the latter to exercise its jurisdiction. NOAA itself in this respect uses the terminology “any
other private space system operator having substantial connections with the United States
or deriving substantial benefits from US law that support its international remote-sensing
operations”;91 examples thereof would be the use of US launchers (requiring in itself a license under the US Commercial Launch Act), the critical involvement of a US ground station or marketing activities within the United States.92
The most prominent requirement to be complied with in order to be granted a license is
to “operate the system in such manner as to preserve the national security of the United
States”; another requirement relevant in the present context is to “notify the Secretary of
any significant or substantial agreement the licensee intends to enter with a foreign nation,
entity, or consortium involving foreign nations or entities.”93 The Secretary of Commerce,
as appropriate having delegated this to NOAA, may exercise a range of investigative, administrative, and regulatory competencies to ensure compliance with the Act and the license.94 Noncompliance with the requirements of the license or attendant regulations may
carry a maximum civil penalty of US$10,000 for each day of ongoing violation (!), whilst
not excluding the possibility to bring criminal charges in addition or instead.95
A good illustration of how the competences of the Secretary of Commerce may be used
in order to protect national security interests—even if, in this case, they did not concern
US national security—concerned the implementation in a very specific case of so-called
“shutter control” inserted into the Act by an amendment in 1998.96 The legal provision so
included provided in full:
(a) Collection and Dissemination.—A department or agency of the United States
may issue a license for the collection or dissemination by a non-Federal entity
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of satellite imagery with respect to Israel only if such imagery is no more detailed or precise than satellite imagery of Israel that is available from commercial sources.
(b) Declassification and Release.—A department or agency of the United States
may declassify or otherwise release satellite imagery with respect to Israel
only if such imagery is no more detailed or precise than satellite imagery of
Israel that is available from commercial sources.97
Thus, also in the context of private satellite remote-sensing activities, the US authorities
can avail themselves of a broad and comprehensive legal toolbox to preclude any national
security interests from being put at risk by such activities, at least to the extent that the
United States can exercise jurisdiction over them.
3.3. The Russian Federation
Russia developed its own national space law in 1993,98 shortly after the dissolution of the
Soviet Union and the collapse of communism required a transition also of the space sector,
previously totally controlled by government, to an era when it would largely have to fend
for itself through becoming appropriately commercialised and privatised99—whilst national security interests of, now, the Russian Federation should obviously continue to be
preserved in that new context. Interestingly, enunciation of the Law was perceived as desirable mainly in reaction to the fact that all space activities in the Soviet era had been
conducted in a manner intricately linked to military activities.100
The scope of the Law and its licensing obligation ratione personae is defined very broadly,
with reference to all “space activities under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation.”101
This jurisdiction must be read to include both territorial and national jurisdiction, as becomes clear when reference is made to other provisions of the Russian Law, and is even
expressly extended to include Russian-registered space objects.102
The demise of the Soviet Union, communism and the secret veil behind which all space
activities were essentially carried out by the Russian military of course did not spell the
end of the involvement of the latter in the former, and the Russian Law is therefore also
rife with references to, inter alia, national security. One of the main goals of the Russian
space endeavour, as organised by means of the Law, is to ensure the security of the Russian
Federation.103 More precisely, one of “[t]he main tasks of space activities under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation shall be (. . .) ensuring defense capabilities of the Russian
Federation.”104 A list of specific prohibitions “to ensure strategic (. . .) security” is added.105
Further references to Russian national security can be found in Articles 4(3) and 6(2); all
such clauses of course will be duly taken into account when any grant of a license is considered under Article 9.106 The 2002 Order on licensing confirmed this approach, making
reference inter alia to “ensuring the protection of data deemed state secret” and observing
requirements designed to protect them (specifically referring to “foreign technical intelligences” (!).107
In addition to those substantive references to the national security of the Russian Federation, the latter is also taken care of in an institutional manner, through the central role
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of the Ministry of Defense provided for by the Law.108 Most particularly, Article 7 of the
Law relegates space activities for the purpose of defence and security of the Russian Federation to the domain of the Ministry of Defense.109 The 2002 Order on licensing, however,
does not make any specific reference to the Ministry of Defense anymore in this specific
context. On the other hand, as pointed out elsewhere, Russia drafted a specific law with
reference to military issues, relevant also for military space activities: Government Regulation No. 889 of 20 November 2008 On Licensing Activities in the Field of Arming and
Military Engineering.110
In sum, the Russian Federation has taken extensive care that its national security interests would not be harmed or interfered with by any private space operations licensed under the Law, both in a substantive sense—allowing licenses to be granted only if compliant
with those interests—and in an institutional sense—allowing the Ministry of Defense a
major role in interpreting whether those conditions are actually met, and hence whether a
license will be granted at all.
3.4. South Africa
As Russia was shedding the shackles on its space programme resulting from its previous
political era in 1993, that same year South Africa essentially was doing the same: with
apartheid out of the door, the need to keep space technology safely locked behind the doors
of the military establishment gave way to an interest in allowing that technology to be put
at the disposal of the peoples and society of the country, including private entrepreneurs.
Hence, on 6 September 1993 the Space Affairs Act of the Republic of South Africa entered
into force111 largely as a response to the growing interest of South African industrial and
service sectors in space.112
The Act, consequently, prominently included a licensing system for private actors interested in undertaking space activities, whereby launching itself and—presumably—operating a launch facility requires a license both when conducted from South African
territory and when conducted by South African nationals elsewhere, whereas all other
space activities require a license (only) if conducted by South African nationals.113 The licensing Section already makes reference to the need to obtain such a license in every instance where the activities to be licensed “may affect national interests.”114 Also, specific
conditions may be imposed in the license to protect those interests.115
In terms of general security aspects, the Space Affairs Act focuses on weapons of mass
destruction and their possible proliferation.116 In consequence, the Minister of Trade and
Industry shall take the prevention of such proliferation, at least to the extent required by
international obligations, into due account when determining the general space policy of
South Africa.117
No clear reference can be found specifically to the national security of South Africa,
however, although the Minister of Trade and Industry, the competent authority under the
Act, can issue regulations concerning the disclosure, transfer, and marketing of any technology or product outside South Africa.118 What remains to be noted is the general competence of the Minister of Defense vis-à-vis his confrere of Trade and Industry to preserve the
national interests when it comes to this type of security.119

14

VON DER

DUNK, THE ISSUE OF NATIONAL SECURITY, 2011

3.5. The Ukraine
The Ukraine, the second largest heir of the space legacy of the Soviet Union, also was the
second former Soviet state to draft a national law, for largely the same reasons and largely
along the same lines as Russia, in 1996.120 Relative to Russia (and also Kazakhstan), the
only category of space capabilities the Ukraine did not inherit was a launch site; the manufacturing of launch vehicles however was a major stronghold of the country’s industry.
The Law on Space Activity of Ukraine provides for a licensing system applicable to
space activities “in [read: undertaken from] the Ukraine or, under jurisdiction of the
Ukraine, abroad,” the latter phrase obviously referring to Ukrainian nationals.121 In addition, in view of the extended and precise formulation of the obligation to register relevant
space objects with the Ukrainian authorities in Article 13, the same phrase would also refer
to space objects so registered.122
In terms of the attention paid to national security issues, allowable purposes for, respectively main principles of space activities under the Law include “national (. . .) defensibility” and “safety of the state.”123 Consequently, the National Space Agency of the Ukraine,
the authority charged with the granting and monitoring of licenses under Articles 6 and
10 of the Law, is to ensure inter alia proper protection of “military (. . .) secrets” in the
process,124 whereas Article 9 imposes a number of restrictions on licensed space activities,
such as involving weapons therein or using the moon and other celestial bodies for military
purposes.
A major reason for establishing the Ukrainian act was the intention of the country to
become a trustworthy and interesting player in the context of international cooperation,
contributing its space heritage whilst in turn profiting from the expertise of others in a
competitive global environment. Thus, Section V of the Law addresses the main principles
applicable to such international cooperation, which notably includes the “strengthening of
the national sovereignty.”125
Another section, Section VI, addresses “[s]pace activity in the area of defence and security of the Ukraine.” It provides amongst others for the central responsibility of the Ministry of Defence to conduct all space activities in the area of defence and national security,
including “construction and use of the military and double assignment space engineering,” and for the further definition of its relationship with the National Space Agency of
the Ukraine by a Rule to be defined.126
Though generally speaking defined in less detail, the Ukrainian Law thus follows in its
overall approach very much the Law of the Russian Federation on Space Activities in allotting a large and explicit role to the Ministry of Defence wherever the national security
of the state would directly impinged upon by space activities, in equal measure limiting
the civil licensing authority in that respect.
3.6. Australia
Australia has, with its 1998 Act,127 called into existence an elaborate licensing system actually establishing four types of licenses: the launch permit, the overseas launch certificate,
the authorisation (of the return to Australia of a space object launched outside the country),
and the space license (to operate a launch facility on Australian territory).128 In addition, in
some cases exemption certificates can be issued.129
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Protecting the interests in Australian national security is not explicitly mentioned
amongst the objects of the Act.130 Nevertheless, in the actual requirements for obtaining
one or the other license the security issues are taken into consideration. Thus, a launch
permit can be granted only if “the Minister does not consider that, for reasons relevant to
Australia’s national security, foreign policy or international obligations, the launch permit
should not be granted.”131 An identical provision pertains to the overseas launch certificate,
the authorisation, and the space license.132 Other provisions prohibit the licensee to become
involved with weapons of mass destruction as part of his licensed activities.133
Further to these requirements, the Act then provides for standard instruments to enforce compliance with them such as revocation, transfer, or suspension of a license.134 In
some cases, specific penalties are provided for, such as a maximum fine of 600 penalty
units or imprisonment of ten years in case of violation of a launch permit condition,135 with
additional provisions on civil penalties provided for more generally.136 Also, as important
from a security perspective, transfer of a space license, launch permit or overseas launch
certificate requires a specific agreement from the responsible Minister.137
On the other hand, there is no explicit reference to the Department of Defence—except
in an indirect manner: a “member of the Defence Force” is not covered by the provisions
on the requirements for launch permits, overseas launch certificates, authorisations, space
licenses, or exemption certificates under Sections 11 through 15 of the Act (as is the Commonwealth itself).138 Australian military space activities, in other words, do not require any
of these types of authorisations.
3.7. Brazil
Brazil represents an interesting case of a state issuing a national space law—an Administrative Edict of 2001 encompassing the Regulation of licenses properly speaking139—most
notably because it is the first developing country to clearly do so, wishing to maximise the
benefits from, in particular, its Alcantara launch site very close to the equator.140 Consequently, many of its provisions deal with the possibility of foreign operators interested in
using Alcantara, and balancing their commercial interests with the interests of Brazil itself
in benefiting from such high-key technology operations beyond simple licensing and access fees.141
The Administrative Edict and the Regulation focus exclusively on launching, providing
an obligation to obtain a license if somebody wishes to launch from Alcantara (or the other
Brazilian launch basis, Barreira do Inferno).142 The Regulation provides for an extended list
of documents to be provided by the license applicant, some of which clearly serve to address possible security concerns of the Brazilian government. These range from the basic
requirement for licensees to have headquarters or be formally represented in Brazil (allowing the authorities to effectively enforce any relevant conditions),143 to a statement of acquaintance with “the Security Regulations and Procedures established by AEB [the
Brazilian Space Agency, which wields the licensing competence under the Administrative
Edict]”144 and a commitment to abide by the technology safeguard controls imposed by
Brazil145 inter alia meant to refer to Brazilian commitments on non-proliferation of missile
technology under the MTCR agreement.146
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Furthermore, the Brazilian Space Agency AEB is entitled to consult, prior to the grant
of a license, with other organs or bodies of the Brazilian government “as to the existence
of conflict with the interests of security and foreign policy concerning the space launching
activities proposed by applicant.”147 With respect to foreign license applicants, in addition
statements are required confirming their authorisation to operate the activities concerned
under the laws of their home countries, as well as to the existence of appropriate safeguard
agreements on sensitive technology between Brazil and their respective home countries.148
3.8. South Korea
Further to its ambitions to become a major space-faring power, South Korea promulgated
its Space Development Promotion Act in 2005.149 As the Act states, one of its main purposes
“is to facilitate the peaceful use and scientific exploration of outer space and to contribute
to national security.”150 South Korea technically speaking is still at war with North Korea,
and ever since its initiation as a separate state feels very much threatened by the close-by
presence not only of North Korea but also of communist China, and until the collapse of
the Soviet Union, that other communist superpower as well—which well explains why
national security issues are so prominently included even in a civil space act designed also
to develop “the national economy and improvement of the people’s living.”151
The obligation to obtain a license to launch (the Act does not as such deal with other
space activities, such as remote sensing), which applies to launches undertaken from South
Korean territory or facilities as much as to launches undertaken with Korean-owned
launch vehicles elsewhere,152 is taking this special national-security context into consideration. In granting a license, the Minister of Science and Technology “may attach necessary
conditions” including “the appropriateness of the purpose of using a launch vehicle,”153
which in light of the aforementioned key purpose of the Act at least in theory should exclude any possibility for such a launch activity to negatively impact South Korea’s national
security. Also, Article 4 of the Act clearly reserves the possibility for other acts and statutes
to exclude certain types of activities, including of course security-related ones, from the
scope of the Act and the possibility to obtain a license under it.154
Further means of control of the national security interests are offered through the Basic
Plan on Space Development Promotion under Article 5 to be formulated by the government. In a centralised country like South Korea such a plan determines the main possibilities also for the private space industry to become realistically involved in space activities
themselves—through R&D support, tax privileges, and suchlike.155 The Minister has to formulate the implementing plan every year after consulting with the “heads of central administrative authorities concerned including the Director General of the National
Intelligence Service,” whereas “matters related to national security need not be publicized.”156 A National Space Committee is installed to deliberate detailed matters regarding
the Basic Plan and the implementing plans, but may be restrained from discussing launch
licenses “if the omission [of such discussions] is necessary for reasons such as national
security.”157
The Ministry of National Defense may not be mentioned anywhere in these particular
clauses; the direct control exercised by the President over the National Space Committee
and the Special Agency for Space Development158 (and by the government as a whole over
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the Basic Plan) would already guarantee that no activities to be licensed under the Act
would present a substantial risk to national security.
Also post-grant, the authorities can exercise substantial control for national security
purposes. In addition to more general causes for revocation of a license (such as pertaining
to general lack of compliance with imposed conditions), “[w]here a head of central administrative authorities concerned requests for the revocation of a license due to an anticipated
serious threat to national security,” that license will indeed be revoked.159 More broadly
still, the Minister of National Defense may request “the suspension of space development
being carried out by a national of the Republic of Korea on account of a military operation
in case of war, disturbance or similar kind of emergency,” in which case the Minister of
Science and Technology shall indeed order the national to suspend relevant activities.160
Finally, “[w]hen the Minister of Science and Technology pushes forward a space development project related to national security, the Minister shall consult heads of central administrative authorities concerned in advance,” whereas “[n]ecessary matters relating to
the establishment and implementation of security measures in relation to the space development project of paragraph 1 shall be prescribed by Presidential Decree.”161
4. Concluding Remarks: A European Issue?
Generally speaking, non-European national space laws and licensing regimes turn out to
be just as diverse in their handling of national security and defence issues in the context of
licensing private space enterprise. They make use of the same generic mechanisms, allowing the licensing authorities to insert conditions and requirements in licenses designed to
protect national security, providing them with competences to enforce such conditions and
requirements even after the fact of granting a license. They may also refer to more institutionalised ways of controlling national security interests, such as by allowing the respective Ministry of Defence a voice in the licensing process and carving out any securitysensitive space activities ipso facto from the licensing process, relegating it to the exclusive
domain of the military or defence authorities.
From that perspective, as also following from the particular shape and form the security
paradigms take on for each particular country (compare, for example, the specific historical
situations of South Korea, Russia, the Ukraine, and South Africa), these non-European examples of national space laws dealing with national security concerns may not present
much of a harmonised and coherent set of laws either, from the perspective of any European state seeking to implement a national space law still. Rather, it presents a sample
sheet of individualised options to assert appropriate sovereign concerns in this area also
in the context of licensing private space operators. If anything, it may be noted that, generally speaking, the non-European space laws are more forceful and explicit in taking care
of such national security–related issues in this context.
This brings us finally to the question of whether, absent much of such specificity, transparency and explicitness (with the exception of France, as argued), there might perhaps be
a role for overarching European institutions in this area. This is not the proper place to go
deep into those issues,162 but obviously the only institutions reasonably representing candidates for such a role are the European Union and ESA.
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As for ESA, as starting point for any discussion it should be noted that the possibility of
the organisation to become involved in handling military and security issues within the
European space endeavour at various levels depends on the interest of individual ESA
member states, as a consequence inter alia of the structure of ESA programmes, in particular the optional ones.163 In particular, the major investors in ESA and ESA programs—
France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and Spain—need to possess the political will
and wherewithal in having ESA become so involved.
Originally, furthermore, the Agency was supposed only to undertake activities for “exclusively peaceful purposes.”164 However, firstly also ESA could not escape the inevitable
close relationship between space activities and security issues, for example in the context
of the Ariane launcher programme. Secondly, its participation in the first decade of the
present century in the two European flagship programmes, Galileo and GMES (Global
Monitoring for the Environment and Security), once more inevitably giving rise to some
security issues, was accepted without much political upheaval, testifying to a growing realisation that also in the (broader) security area, strong European cooperation in space was
becoming, if perhaps not yet unavoidable altogether, at least more and more beneficial—
as well as, simply put, a fact of life.
In the context of Galileo, in spite of the civil governance structure developed firstly the
possibility of potential adversary use of its Signals will have to be faced165 and secondly
the envisaged Public-Regulated Service (PRS), while painstakingly avoiding any reference
to military or defence, was modelled in many respects on the GPS Precise Positioning Signal—which is being used by the US military and its allies. Whilst the PRS is officially to be
made accessible to all governmental services, the debate on whether this should not also
include the use by the military of respective member states is gradually but clearly moving
into the direction of acceptance of the latter.
In the context of GMES, the concept of “Security” as part of its official label gradually
came to be interpreted beyond the concept of “civil security” so as to encompass more
“traditional” military and defence issues of security.166 As GMES is tasked specifically to
provide Europe with its own independent and comprehensive satellite earth observation
infrastructure for generation of data and information on a comprehensive range of subjects, it will bring the inclusion of defence, security, and military matters even more explicitly into the broader civil European governance structures to be developed in this context.
The major partner of ESA in both the Galileo and the GMES contexts is, of course, the
European Union. Also the Union has developed from an entity officially barred from substantially dealing with military and defence issues until the Treaty on European Union167
to an actor with increasing juridically enshrined possibilities to make its views heard.
The Treaty on European Union introduced the pillar of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) into the institutional construct of the Union,168 although as such this pillar remained intergovernmental in character for the time being. From this starting point,
however, the Union’s role in the security arena developed along two lines.
Firstly, the CFSP gradually developed into a more integral part of the Union’s institutional structure, by now absorbing the Western European Union.169 With the Treaty of Lisbon,170 the CFSP is even formally integrated into the Union as part of the Treaty on the
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Functioning of the European Union,171 although that does not really take away its essentially intergovernmental character: the individual member states still retain a large and
sovereign measure of control over the way they wish to handle national security issues.172
Secondly, however, in a much narrower area the Community, then Union, did commence to exercise proper legislative competences: that of trade in security-sensitive items
and know-how, further to the MTCR and the Wassenaar Arrangement.173 Thus, Regulation
1334/2000 provided a baseline framework for implementing in a binding European context
the international obligations resulting from the formally nonbinding MTCR and Wassenaar regimes, while working towards a harmonization of the ways and means by which
individual member states would implement and apply those international obligations and
guidelines.174 This Regulation has been updated ever since on average almost once a year,
the latest version being Resolution 428/2009.175 The regime inter alia provides for a Community General Export Authorisation (CGEA) which is to replace national export authorisations of security-sensitive items and know-how in a limited set of circumstances as well
as for certain obligations of transparency and loose conformity with respect to national
export authorisations wherever these are still applicable.176
Apart from this specific (and still limited, though growing) measure of competence of
the Union in matters pertinent to security issues, however, it should—a contrario—be concluded that for the time being there is little to be expected in terms of an EU lead in the
development of harmonised clauses relating to the licensing of private space operators in
the field of security and military issues. It should also be pointed out here that following
the Treaty of Lisbon’s entry into force, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union specifically excludes the competence to harmonise national laws and regulations of the
member states from the so-called space competence now inserted.177
Since also the European Space Agency has no competences in the area of licensing of
space activities—even apart from the specific aspects of licensing space activities relevant
from the perspective of concerns with national and international security—it seems that,
for the time being, those European states that have not yet developed comprehensive national space legislation dealing with the licensing of private space enterprise almost completely remain at liberty to handle in that process their particular security considerations
and concerns. That may be an almost self-evident consequence of the importance attached
by all sovereign states to their national security; obviously that in itself does not suffice to
deny the benefits for Europe of arriving at least at a certain measure of coordination—if
only, to prevent the existing extent of the freedoms to trade and move goods within the
European Union from giving rise within Europe to certain “flags of convenience” for all
the wrong purposes.
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